road 10 to a police officer using his job in order to sexually exploit vulnerable women. 11 The flexibility of common law offences, which enables them to adapt to changing practical situations, can result in a lack of clarity and blurred boundaries. A particular problem in MiPO is that the type of conduct it covers is so incredibly varied. Although abuse of power is at the heart of the offence, the councillor's abuse of his position is rather different to that of the police officer and their conduct is even more different.
Sexual misconduct as MiPO
There are some, but not many, reported appeal cases involving MiPO, so, to get a clearer view of what kind of activity is being charged as MiPO, or is resulting in convictions for MiPO, we also examined newspaper reports going back fourteen years to 2002 looking for sexual misconduct which was also alleged to be misconduct in public office. Our analysis of newspaper reports meant that it was sometimes possible to trace cases through from first appearance to trial and see how charges changed over time, something often not possible from appeal case reports. We were also able to capture cases where there were acquittals or where the defendant was convicted but did not appeal.
The cases
Cases involving 19 defendants were reported in the law reports. Three of these were augmented by details from newspaper reports and 42 defendants/suspects were mentioned in newspapers alone. Categorising cases by defendant, 36 were police officers and police employees, 15 worked in or with prisons (including as nurses), four were probation workers and one was a court clerk. There was one Church of England cleric 12 and two council CCTV operators 13 charged with MiPO, but National Health Service medical professionals were held not to be public office holders 14 and MPs who may have sexual misconducted themselves not charged. 15 It is startling how those working in the criminal justice system (CJS) were the overwhelming majority of perpetrators of sexual misconduct related to their office. As we relied on a lot of newspaper reports, this may be because such defendants are more newsworthy. That does not seem particularly likely as it is the sexual element of the misconduct which engages the salacious interest of reporters (and their readers) at least as much as the office holder's position.
If a council officer had been demanding sexual favours to write off Council Tax bills, it seems very unlikely that there would not be significant local reporting at least (and our researches took in local as well as national press); the voyeuristic CCTV operators' case was reported in the press. There is also the possibility that public office holders outside the CJS are misconducting themselves sexually, but there is no complaint to the police or the Crown Prosecution Service does not recommend charge. Neither possibility seems likely. There is doubtless underreporting of this form of sexual misconduct as there is of all sexual misconduct, 16 but no reason for sexual misconduct by other public office holders being particularly underreported. It would be harder psychologically and practically for a victim to report to the police misconduct by police officers than by, for example, England and Wales, Statistics Bulletin, 10 January 2013, Executive Summary and pp16-18. civil servants. It does not seem likely that there is underreporting of sexual misconduct by non-CJS public office holders specifically.
Our suggestion is that the power which those in the CJS have, particularly police and prison workers, is particularly great and this is the reason for the greater prevalence of sexual misconduct by CJS workers than by other public office holders. Misconduct may be more obviously wrong because of the power imbalance. The temptation is greater for office holders to predate, should they be so inclined, but also for them to be predated upon to corrupt that powerful system in favour of the sexual partner. Although there are others in our society who hold great power over the public -in particular medical professionals -they are not considered to be holders of public office and so not caught by the offence.
Types of sexual misconduct covered
It became clear that the sexual misconduct in these cases fell into three main categories: 17 (1) The defendant abused his/her position for sexual gratification (often, but not always, sexual relations), usually with a vulnerable person -an exploitation of the public office for sexual gain.
(2) The defendant did not exploit the public office, but instead engaged in a relationship, which by its very nature corrupted the system, and left the defendant open to being further corrupted. Such a relationship will usually be sexual, but need not be. (3) The defendant did not exploit his/her position or corrupt the system, but had sex whilst on public duty. (A number of cases involved the defence contention that there was a consensual relationship and the only issue was that the officer was on duty, but in the majority of these the prosecution allegation was that the officer was predating his/her victim. There were, however, some cases were it was common ground that there was no exploitation and the wrong was simply sex on duty.)
Interrelation with sexual offences
It emerged from our analysis that there was not a consistent approach to the charging of MiPO for sexual misconduct. Sometimes no sexual offence was charged at all 19 , sometimes MiPO was a lesser alternative to a non-consensual sexual offence 20 and sometimes no offence was charged and disciplinary proceedings were mounted instead. 21 There is now Crown Prosecution the absence of clear advice as to how MiPO be used as an alternative, an inconsistent approach is being taken.
We noted that MiPO has been regularly used as a pragmatic way for sexual offending to be dealt with, where the defendant pleaded guilty to MiPO having been charged initially with apparently appropriate sexual offences. 24 Such a guilty plea may be an attractive option to the defendant because it is not a conviction for a sexual offence (the consequences of a conviction for which are greater than for MiPO). It may be an attractive option to the prosecution when the sexual offence alternatives are non-consensual and the victim may be a poor or reluctant witness. Although it is understandable that pragmatic decisions have sometimes been taken, that does not mean that it is appropriate. MiPO is effectively providing a non-sexual, less serious alternative offence in cases where the defendant is in public office which is not available to a defendant who is not in public office, resulting in the paradoxical situation that defendants whose offending is aggravated by their public office end up with convictions for a lesser offence. It is important to analyse what the wrong is at the heart of the three categories of conduct identified. Despite them all involving sexual activity, it is submitted the wrong is different in each one.
The limits of MiPO
In the first category the wrong is two-fold. The defendant has abused his/her position of authority, which in itself involves an abuse of the public's trust because it is the public which has granted that authority to the defendant.
Beyond that, there is a specific sexual wrong against a specific person. This does not necessarily mean that there is a violation of the person's autonomy as that suggests that consent is all that matters; autonomy is very important but protection of autonomy is not the only aim of the laws on sexual offending. The wrong can be transgressing a societal line rather a line set by the person exercising their autonomy. For instance, incestuous sexual intercourse may be factually consensual, but is still a criminal wrong 28 , as is consensual sexual contact between a teacher and 17 year old pupil 29 or a carer and mentally disordered patient 30 .
In the second category the sexual nature of the misconduct is really background, the wrong is the corruption of the system for those in it and the public. For example, the prison officer who engages in a relationship with a prisoner is corrupting the system not just by giving favours to the prisoner (or being blackmailed into doing so) but also by treating other prisoners differently. The public, it goes without saying, are also wronged having entrusted the prisoner to the officer's care.
The final category is not always going to involve a criminal wrong at all. The conduct may amount to a breach of the office holder's employment terms or code of conduct and be dealt with under these instead. Thus the married MP who had sex with his mistress at the Houses of Parliament 31 and the Chief Constable who missed meetings to have sex with his mistress 32 were disciplined but not prosecuted. When a police office was convicted for what the jury must have found was not unconsensual sex whilst on duty, a retrial was not allowed when the conviction was quashed on the ground of fresh evidence, Elias LJ questioning whether the conduct could amount to MiPO. 33 The answer to this query must be that it depends on the circumstances. A police officer, who has sexual intercourse with her partner because they are trying to get pregnant and she is particularly fertile at that time, is not causing any wrong to anyone. In contrast, there could be a criminal wrong if the officer neglected an aspect of her duty whilst having, or in order to have, the sexual relations, for example, failing to answer an urgent call for assistance over the police radio. This wilful neglect would be a dereliction of duty, as the officer's failure to intervene in Dytham was, the sexual activity merely being what it was that the defendant was doing instead of her duty. Where the misconduct was sexual, one unifying theme emerged which was that there was no problem with identifying the fault element required. This suggests that the criticism based on the changing fault element 36 is at heart a criticism based on the sheer range of conduct covered by MiPO. This fortifies our view that, at least with regard to offences involving sexual conduct, the conduct and the wrong which it creates/risks should determine the offence, rather than the public office of the defendant being the determinative factor in the offence.
Inconsistency as to who may be a defendant
The Court of Appeal in 2004 37 referred to the unfairness that could arise where people who carry out similar duties may or may not be liable to prosecution depending on whether they can be defined as 'public officers'. "What were once purely public functions are now frequently carried out by employees in private employment, for example those concerned with security at courts and the transport of defendants."
The Court declined to define a public officer, however, but said: 'This potential unfairness adds weight, in our view, to the conclusion that the offence should be strictly confined but we do not propose to changeable fault element is also unavoidable if a single offence is retained to cover all the possible conduct currently caught by MiPO. It is submitted that although a general, redrafted MiPO offence would be capable of adequately covering the second and third categories identified above sufficiently, it could not also cover the first category, as it could not properly reflect the sexual wrong at the heart of that category. A sexual offence would reflect the wrong and enable a clearer fault element to be identified -one appropriate to this subset of misconduct in public office. It would cover the situation where there may arguably be consent to the sexual conduct, but that consent was obtained by exploitation of the defendant's position of power. We believe that this is the kind of conduct which is often currently being charged as a non-consent sexual offence but resulting in guilty pleas/convictions for MiPO.
In our response to the first Law Commission consultation on MiPO we identified the problem of the different kinds of sexual misconduct covered and suggested a separate offence and raised the possibility of basing it on the victim's vulnerability. 41 There are difficulties with this approach. 42 Sometimes a victim will be inherently vulnerable (with, for example, mental health issues or drug problems) and sometimes the vulnerability will be due to the relationship with the defendant office holder (where, for example, the defendant has arrested the victim). We considered various possible categories and definitions of vulnerability before concluding that focusing on the victim's vulnerability means losing sight of the defendant's misconduct. In searching for a replacement for MiPO for the first category we suggest that the offences that deal with sexual wrongs that are not based on lack of consent should be the starting point:
(1) The child sex offences (where consent is no part of the offence). 44 (2) The position of trust offences against young people aged under 18. 45 SOA 2003 ss. 5-8. 45 SOA 2003 ss. 16-19. 46 SOA 2003 ss. 38-41. 47 SOA 2003 victim is young 49 , or has a mental disorder 50 ), but it can be because the defendant is in an ascertainable position of power in relation to the victim (carers of the mentally disordered 51 and teachers in relation to their older pupils 52 ). It is therefore possible to draft offences which focus on the defendant's position and abuse thereof for sexual gain rather than the victim's vulnerability and we suggest this as a more appropriate model for the MiPO offence which needs to cover category one activity (abuse of position for sexual gain).
The essential elements we suggest for a MiPO-based sexual offence are:
(1) the defendant holds a position of power over or in relation to the victim (2) the defendant knows or could reasonably be expected to know of that position of power (3) the defendant abuses that power and is aware that his/her conduct would be seen by reasonable people as an abuse of that power jargon-based detail who holds a position of trust in relation to a child. As soon as the childcare or protection regime changes its structure or even its terminology, these sections have to be amended. That is not clarity; it is obfuscation by weight of detail. It is important that "position of power" is not too broad to avoid every slight power-imbalance in a sexual relationship to result in a criminal offence, so we suggest that "position of power" be defined as "holding a position in which the defendant can exert power over the victim's liberty and/or health and/or the investigation/charge/prosecution of a criminal offence which involves the victim and/or someone for whom the victim feels responsible."
This limits the offence to those with real and meaningful power over or in relation to the victim without the need to look at whether the power is "public" or not which, we submit, is irrelevant in relation to this offence. The offence will, we submit, have greater legitimacy borne out of not just clarity but the removal of the artificial distinction between potential defendants based on public office rather than power held. The test enables the offence to respond to political changes to the provision of services without requiring changes to legislation (for example, should there be 'outsourcing' of police powers, the test would still cover privatised officers as the focus is on the power rather than the office).
We rely on the phrase "abuses that power" to avoid criminalising those who might seek to impress a potential partner with their position. Hoping that a potential partner is going to be impressed with the declaration 'I'm a police officer' involves no criminal wrong that we can identify and where there is no abuse, there is no offence. It will require juries to determine whether the defendant has actually abused his/her position, but this issue is exactly the kind of thing which juries should be left to determine, within constraints. Such constraint would be provided both by the requirement that it be abuse rather than use of the power and by a requirement that the judge not leave the offence to go before the jury unless s/he is satisfied that the abuse can be identified and there is evidence capable of supporting a finding that it does indeed amount to an abuse of power. It is submitted that this would provide sufficient clarity to enable a potential defendant to avoid abusing his/her position and thus being prosecuted. We have consciously echoed the Ghosh approach to dishonesty as, despite the academic unhappiness with it, 53 it is a practical test which is easily applied by juries on a daily basis.
We considered adding the requirement that the abuse be "serious" but concluded that that risks the circularity already seen in the gross negligence manslaughter requirement that the negligence be serious enough to be considered a crime 54 which is certainly not easily explained theoretically or practically. There is also the risk that a defendant will use a severity requirement to dismiss an allegation as 'banter' or horseplay. Despite the risks, we consider that severity is best considered by the CPS when deciding whether or not to charge at all.
The conduct covered includes not just direct physical contact with the victim but also covers contacting a victim for sexual gratification (for example, by telephone or social media) and making a victim perform sexual acts even if the defendant is not directly involved, or even physically present (for example where the victim is required to perform sexual acts over the internet). We include these two latter categories to cover conduct we found in the cases we examined 55 Finally, the suggested offence would sufficiently label the defendant's conduct. It would be clear what the defendant had done. S/he could be sentenced appropriately for the sexual wrong at the heart of the offence.
Conclusion
MiPO should survive the Law Commission's current consultation, but as the parent of clearer, more focused offences which properly reflect the misconduct involved and reflect the truth of who in modern society holds positions of power. Proposals for reform that do not cover sexually exploitative abuse of power separately would be incomplete and we urge the Law Commission to include a sexual offence in their final report.
